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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F· UTAH 
J i\CK E. LAKE, 
-vs.-
Pla.intiff, Respondent, and 
Cross-Ap·pellant, 
ROBERT J. PINDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9382 
BRIEF O·F RESP·O,NDENT 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
We cannot agree with the statement of facts out-
lined in the appellant's brief. The facts as developed 
at the trial of this case amply justify the findings of the 
trial court and the judgment rendered on the question of 
liability. 
During the latter part of February, 1958, the defend-
ant, Robert J. Pinder, met the plaintiff, Jack E. Lake, 
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in J?enver, Colorado, to discuss two business propo-
sitions: 
a) A joint venture between Lake and Pinder to ex-
ploit a franchise agreement owned by Lake to distribute 
therapeutic massage equipment in the State of Texas 
manufactured by Life Massage and Home Equipment 
Company ; and, 
b) The exchange of mining stock owned by Lake in 
the L. H. & L. Mining Company for stock in the Stand-
ard Gilsonite Company, of which Pinder was the 
president. 
With respect to the former venture it was agreed by 
Pinder that he would lend to the venture between 
$10,000.00 and $15,000.00 as "\Vorking capital to reim-
burse Lake for expenses incurred in obtaining training in 
Denver, his living expenses while organizing the busi-
ness in the State of Texas, and for advertising and other 
expenses of building a sales organization in Texas. It 
was agreed that from the first profits from the venture 
Pinder would first receive back the money loaned and 
then the two would each draw an equal salary from the 
company and divide any profits. (R-53, 57, 67, 68, 217, 
218, 222, 223, 224) Pinder agreed to have his Texas law 
firm incorporate the venture. (R-57) Pinder, pursuant 
to this agreement, loaned $2,000.00 to the venture to 
help pay the expenses and in addition paid to Stanley 
Lake, the plaintiff's brother "\Yho owned the master fran-
chise for the Western States, Hawaii, and Alaska, addi-
tional sums for advertising for salesmen in Texas, travel 
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expenses, and other expenses aggregating approximately 
$800.00. (R-226) Thereafter Pinder met Stanley Lake, 
one of the three owners of the master franchise for the 
Western States, Hawaii, and Alaska, and Jack Lake, the 
plaintiff, in Houston, Texas, to plan the setting up of the 
Texas operation. They had a prospective State Manager 
travel from San Antonio to Houston for Pinder to 
interview, and Pinder, after indicating his satisfaction 
with the man, agreed to advance the candidate $400.00 
expenses to go to Denver to be trained. (R-77, 78, 227, 
228, 229) Pinder later advanced further funds from the 
proceeds of the sale of certain Standard Gilsonite stock, 
a transaction hereafter more fully described, and loaned 
the proceeds to the venture but failed to advance the 
funds agreed to be advanced and later refused to keep 
his end of the bargain and announced to Stanley Lake in 
a conversation in Salt Lake City that he would, if neces-
sary, even deny ever being in Texas. (R. 234, 235) This 
conversation with Stanley Lake is not denied by Pinder. 
With respect to the exchange of L. H. & L. stock 
owned by Jack Lake for Standard Gilsonite stock, an 
agreement was signed by Pinder receipting for the L. H. 
& L. stock and making Pinder a trustee for Lake to effect 
the transaction. The document (Ex. -2) contains the 
following language written in Pinder's own handwriting: 
"I hand you forth,vith a receipt for 7,500 shares 
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred) L. H. & L. min-
ing stock as trustee to be delivered to Standard 
Gilsonite upon payment of Thirty-Seven Thou-
sand FiYe Hundred (37,500) shares of Standard 
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stock. Said stock to be escrowed on delivery as 
mutually agreed. 
R. J. Pinder, President 
Standard'' 
Pinder received possession of the stock, flew in his 
private plane to Salt Lake City, Utah, and promptly vio-
lated the trust agreement by delivering the L. H. & L. 
stock to Standard Gilsonite Company before receiving 
the Standard stock owned by Lake. 
Q. And what did you do with Mr. Lake's stock~ 
A. I brought it to Salt Lake, I believe that eve-
ning, and the next day gave it to the Treasurer of 
Standard Gilsonite Company. (R-252, 253) 
The plaintiff brought suit in June, 1958, and the de-
fendant did not even cause the stock to be issued until 
January 19, 1959, almost one year after the trust agree-
ment was entered into. (R-157) 
Pinder agreed at the time the transaction was made, 
to sell the stock for Lake at the best possible price and 
represented he had special knowledge of the market and 
could get a better price for Lake than Lake could get for 
himself. Lake agreed to escrow his stock \Vith Pinder and 
to let him act as his trustee to sell the stock for him. 
(R-62, 63, 215) 
In April, 1958, Pinder explained to Jack Lake that 
he wished to sell some of his (Pinder's) stock in order 
to meet his commitment to Lake to put up the necessary 
capital for the Life l\iassage franchise in Texas but that 
it would embarrass him as President of Standard to have 
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it appear to his investors that he was selling his own 
stock at a cheap price, and asked Lake to let him borrow 
some of his (Lake's) stock for delivery, and promised 
to replace it. 
''He said, after all, I am trustee for you. All I 
have to do is transfer stock back into the account 
for you." (R-74) 
Lake agreed to let Pinder handle this transaction 
and signed two letters authorizing Pinder to cause the 
stock to be transferred to Pinder's buyers. Mr. Lake 
received $4,000.00 from the first transaction which he 
turned over to Pinder and $5,000.00 from the second sale 
"~hich was put in the joint venture bank account. Pinder 
advanced only about one-half the funds he agreed to 
advance for the Texas venture and then took the position 
that the stock had really been sold for the account of 
Lake and denied any participation whatever in the Life 
1\Iassage venture and refused to issue any stock what-
ever to Lake. Before trial the Standard Gilsonite Cor-
poration, pursuant to a stipulated settlement, issued to 
Lake 6,500 shares of stock as a settlement of its liability 
and was dismissed. (R-6) 
The trial court found in favor of Lake on all the 
issues and fixed the damages at the price of the stock 
when sold by Pinder to the Texas, Witherspoon and 
McGee. 
The defendant made a motion for a new trial and 
among other points argued that the court erred in its 
opinion that the endorsements on the back of the checks 
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made payable to Lake as a loan to the Life Massage ven-
ture were put on after the checks were cashed. This was 
argued at length to the trial judge who advised counsel 
that the motion for a new trial did not properly raise 
this issue and that this was immaterial to the decision in 
any evtnt, since both sides agreed that the funds were 
advanced as a loan and the court had found that these 
funds were loaned pursuant to the agreement by Pinder 
to finance the Life Massage venture and whether the 
legend on the checks recited that the money was a loan 
did not make any difference and that the court still chose 
to believe the evidence given by the plaintiff and his wit-
nesses rather than the defendant's evidence. The court 
pointed out that if the defendant intended the motion for 
a new trial to be based upon newly discovered evidence 
no supporting affidavits were on file and the court could 
not consider the suggestion that there was newly discov-
ered evidence available. 
The court further stated that it did not mean to 
convey the impression that its decision was based upon 
the presence of absence of the legend on the checks since 
all agreed they were loans, and this would not effect 
the court 's decision in the case even if the proper motion 
had been made. 
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the 
trial court. The plaintiff cross-appealed from the con-
clusion of law and judgment on the sole ground that the 
court erred in the determination of the measure of dam-
ages. At the trial the evidence showed that during 1958 
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the stock rose to a price in excess of $2.50 per share dur-
ing the year following the time Pinder refused to deliver 
the stock to Lake. The trial judge fixed the damages as 
of the day that Pinder had his stock transactions with 
McGee and Witherspoon in March, 1958, instead of the 
highest market price. The plaintiff contended that the 
measure should have been of the highest market value 
within a reasonable time after Pinder repudiated the 
trust agreement in May, 1958, and refused to cause the 
stock to be delivered to Lake. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE ALL SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
PoiNT II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE UNCHALLENGED 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENTS. 
PoiNT III. 
THE DEFENDANT- APPELLANT MADE NO 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND 
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE YET 
ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE TO 
THIS COURT ON APPEAL BY AFFIDAVIT AND 
ARGUMENT IN HIS BRIEF. 
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PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE 
PLAINTIFF THE HIGHEST MARKET PRICE OF 
THE STOCK FROM THE TIME OF REFUSAL TO 
DELIVER THE STOCK TO WITHIN A REASON-
ABLE TIME THEREAFTER. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE ALL SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The appellant complains that the Findings of Fact 
made by the trial judge are unsupported by the evidence 
in five particulars. He apparently concedes that in all 
other respects they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. In the interest of clarity we will treat each objec-
tion as made. 
' 'a) That the court erred in finding that the de-
fendant agreed 'vith the plaintiff to deliver the 
L. H. & L. stock 'only upon the payment to the 
plaintiff of 37,500 shares of the capital stock of 
Standard Gilsonite Company.' " (Appellant's 
brief P-14) 
The appellant abstracts only a portion of an isolated 
statement from the record made by the plaintiff to attack 
this finding. The finding is clearly supported by the 
great weight of the evidence: 
1. The trust agreement itself (Ex. -2) clearly states 
that the L. H. & L. stock of Lake's is ''to be delivered to 
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~tandard Gilsonite upon payment of Thirty-seven Thou-
sand Five Hundred shares (37,500) of Standard stock to 
be escrowed on delivery as mutually agreed.'' This clear-
ly empowers the trustee acting for Lake to deliver Lake's 
stock only upon payment of the Gilsonite stock. 
2. Jack Lake testified as follows : 
''. . . he would not deliver my L. H. & L. stock 
until he made sure they would issue the 37,500 
shares \vhich he would hold for me because he had 
a place on it and could sell it at places better than 
the local brokers, so I signed a letter stating he 
was acting as my trustee." {R-62) 
The above was the explanation of the conversation 
prior to executing the trust agreement. The Defendant-
Appellant Pinder drafted the trust agreement and the 
terms are clear and unambiguous in regard to this point. 
The plaintiff, Jack Lake, had no formal education except 
grade school and relied upon Pinder to draft the agree-
ment. {R-106) On cross-examination by the defendant's 
attorney the plaintiff further explained his understand-
ing of the trust agreement : 
'' Q. What does the 'vord 'trustee' mean to you, 
l\Ir. Lake~ Have you had any law training~' 
A. Well, I never had any training. Well, in my 
thinking it means you give to someone and you 
trust him to hold it. 
Q. With your L. H. & L. stock~ 
A. ''r ell, he gave me a letter to sign. 
Q. Well, this is \Yhat you were really trusting 
him \Yith? Do you think the trustee is under a duty 
to go get your stock fro msomebody else~ 
.A.. \Y. ell, he said he would.'' ( R-112, 113) 
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The trust agreement also provided that the Gil-
sonite stock when issued would be escrowed with Pinder 
to be sold for the benefit of Lake. The Defendant-Appel-
lant does not challenge the portion of the paragraph 2 of 
the Findings of Fact that Pinder agreed to act as a 
trustee for Lake to receive Lake's stock and dispose of it 
for Lake's benefit: 
''The defendant requested that the plaintiff per-
mit the defendant to receive the plaintiff's stock 
to be issued in Standard Gilsonite Company as 
trustee for the plaintiff, representing to the plain-
tiff that because of his peculiar and intimate 
knowledge of the market for said stock, and of 
the condition of Standard Gilsonite Company, 
that he would be able to obtain the best possible 
market price for said stock, and that he would 
sell 15,000 shares of said stock for the plaintiff 
at a minimum of $1.00 per share, and assured the 
plaintiff that he would be able to sell the balance 
of said stock from time to time at a substantially 
higher price, and that the defendant would sell 
the stock at the best possible price and remit the 
proceeds to the plaintiff.'' (R-16) 
Hence the Appellant at least admits that Pinder 
agreed to obtain the stock for Lake and act in a fiduciary 
capacity to sell it at the best market price for Lake's 
benefit and that he guaranteed Lake at least $1.00 per 
share on 15,000 shares and a higher price on the balance. 
"b) That the court erred in finding 'that the de-
fendant breached his trust agreement and deliv-
ered the plaintiff's L. H. & L. stock to Standard 
Gilsonite Company immediately upon his return 
to Salt Lake City from Denver, Colorado.'' (R-16) 
10 
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This finding is supported by Pinder's own testimony: 
"Q. 1\nd \vhat did you do with Mr. Lake's stock~ 
A. I brought it to Salt Lake, I believe, that eve-
ning, and the next day gave it to the treasurer of 
Standard Gilsonite Company.'' (R-252, 253) 
This was a direct violation of the terms of the trust 
agreement that the L. H. & L. stock was to be delivered 
to Standard Gilsonite upon. payment of Thirty-seven 
Thousand Five Hundred shares (37,500) of Standard 
stock.'' Appellant argues in his brief that this was not 
a breach because ''the evidence did not show there was 
anything that would lead defendant to believe that Stand-
ard Gilsonite would not issue the 37,500 shares agreed 
upon to plaintiff." (Appellant's brief P-15) 
We submit that this excuse for the breach of trust is 
no excuse at all. The delivery of the stock by the trustees 
was a breach of the terms of his own agreement regard-
less of whether he anticipated that Standard Gilsonite 
would not issue the stock. This agreement is particu-
larly specious in the light of the fact that Pinder was the 
chief executive officer of Standard. Appellant argues 
that the failure to deliver the Standard stock was because 
the secretary of Standard experienced some difficulties 
in accomplishing transfer of the L. H. & L. stock. This 
is a distortion of the record. The L. H. & L. stock was 
transferred many months before any Standard stock \\'"as 
issued to Respondent. Further, the trust agreement pro-
vided that the L. H. & L. stock would not even be delivered 
until the Standard stock was issued. 
11 
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"c) That the court erred in finding that 'the de-
fendant, Robert Pinder agreed with the plaintiff 
that he would advance the venture $15,000.00 to 
provide working capital for the organizational ex-
penses, including the living expenses and expenses 
already incurred by the plaintiff, Jack E. Lake 
while in training with the Life Massage and Home 
Equipment Company in Denver, Colorado. (T-17) 
Appellant attacks this finding because there are 
uncertain sums mentioned in the testimony as to the exact 
amount that would be necessary to get the Texas fran-
chise operating. At one time it was estimated that be-
tween $12,000.00 and $13,000.00 would be needed to safely 
get the business going. (R-56) It was explained to Pinder 
by Stanley Lake, owner of the Western States franchise, 
that it might take as much as $15,000.00 to pay the ex-
penses of getting the Texas franchise going. (R-222) 
Pinder said ''there would be no difficulty whatsoever in 
putting up that amount of money to finance the Texas 
situation." (R-223) 
We submit this point is of no consequence anyway. 
It was agreed by Pinder that the $2,500.00 advanced to 
Lake would come out of the profits of the Texas venture 
(R-127) and was a part of the Pinder commitment: 
''This $2,500.00 you are referring to "~as a portion 
of the $12,000.00 or $13,000.00. This was a part of 
this obligation. I had this obligation in order to 
keep my franchise.'' (R-127) 
The money advanced by Pinder consisted of $2,000.00 
to Lake to take care of expenses incurred in his training 
in Denver and Texas, $500.00 advanced to pay the ex-
12 
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penses of Stanley J. Lake and approximately $300.00 
in advertising and other expenses. (R-189, 242, 69) 
''c) The court erred in finding 'that the defend-
ant did not intend to deliver the stock to the plain-
tiff as agrPed but intended to defraud him of his 
stock.' '' ( T-19) 
Appellant objects to the above finding. While this 
finding by the trial judge is not at all necessary to find 
liability, it being sufficient to support the judgment that 
the defendant simply failed to deliver the stock as agreed, 
the evidence almost impels such a conclusion. The appel-
lant does not challenge paragraph 2 of the findings and 
these alone would be sufficient to justify such a conclusion 
and alone would be sufficient to sustain the judgment. 
The appellant further does not challenge the findings 
made by the trial court contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 
6, and 7, with the exception of the portions deleted here-
after and the above quoted findings respecting the intent 
of Pinder. We submit that from the following portion of 
the findings not challenged by appellant no other con-
clusions could be reasonably drawn: 
4. That prior to the delivery to the defendant 
of the L. H. & L. stock, the plaintiff and defend-
ant entered into an agreement to establish a joint 
venture for the sale of the products manufactured 
by the Life Massage and Home Equipment Com-
pany under a franchise for the State of Texas. 
Pursuant to this agreement the defendant ad-
Yanced the sum of $2,000.00. The defendant, 
pursuant to the joint venture, requested that 
the Company Sales l\Ianager and other per-
13 
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sonnel from the Life Massage and Home 
Equipment Company in Denver proceed to the 
State of Texas and interview sales person-
nel there to obtain a State ~fanager. The de-
fendant Pinder wired $500.00 to Denver to pay the 
traveling expenses incurred by the home office per-
sonnel in traveling to the State of Texas, and paid 
for the advertising to obtain personnel in Texas. 
Subsequently the defendant Pinder met with the 
plaintiff and with Stanley Lake in Houston, Texas, 
for the purpose of setting up of the proposed 
Texas organization, and did interview an indi-
vidual from San Antonio who, it was agreed, 
would go into training in Denver to prepare to 
be the State Manager, and the defendant agreed 
to pay his expenses. The defendant failed to ad-
vance any additional funds to the venture. The 
defendant promised to have his attorneys in Dal-
las, Texas, set up a corporation to receive an 
assignment of the franchise and to have his book-
keeper in Salt Lake City set up the books and 
records for the venture, but did not do so. 
5. That on or about the 4th day of April, 1958, 
the defendant called the plaintiff on the telephone 
and advised the plaintiff that he had a plan which 
would enable him to put into the joint venture a 
portion of the $15,000.00 agreed upon and asked 
the plaintiff to meet him in Amarillo, Texas. At 
that meeting he explained to the plaintiff that he 
had large amounts of stock in Standard Gilsonite 
Company but that as President of the Company 
he could not sell the stock himself because it would 
be embarrassing to him if it was kno"~n that he as 
President of the Company 'Yas selling his stock, 
and that if the plaintiff would authorize him to sell 
some of his stock to the proposed buyers ""'ho ""'ere 
already 8tockholders in the corporation he would 
either deliver straight stock to fill the order or 
would, if he used the plaintiff's stock, replace it 
14 
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immediately with other stock, The plaintiff agreed 
to permit the defendant to do this, and they went 
to Hereford, Texas, to the offices of James W. 
Witherspoon. The defendant went into conference 
in the private office of James W. Witherspoon 
and the plaintiff was left in the waiting room until 
the transaction was completed. The plaintiff was 
asked to sign a document authorizing the transfer 
of 16,000 shares of the stock of Standard Gilsonite 
Company and was given a check for $4,000.00. 
Immediately after leaving the office of James W. 
Witherspoon the defendant requested that the 
check be endorsed over to him, which the plain-
tiff did. The plaintiff then asked the defendant 
if he was not going to put the money into the 
Life Massage and Home Equipment Venture, and 
the defendant told the plaintiff that he needed 
some of the money for a short time, and asked the 
plaintiff how much money he needed to pay bills 
incurred in the venture. The plaintiff indicated 
that there were about $1,300.00 in bills incurred, 
and the defendant then gave him his check for the 
$1,300.00. At a subsequent meeting in Houston 
in the Buffalo Inn Motel, the plaintiff and the 
defendant discussed the progress of their business 
Yenture, and the plaintiff advised the defendant 
that they needed additional funds to carry on 
the business. The defendant promised the bal-
ance of the $15,000.00 as agreed, and suggested 
that the defendant would sell an additional 15,000 
shares of stock to Mr. Witherspoon and asso-
ciates at 30 cents a share. The defendant dictated 
a document for the plaintiff to write and execute, 
and showed the plaintiff how to execute a draft on 
the said James W. Witherspoon. In both transac-
tions the defendant assured the plaintiff that the 
sale of the stock was a personal transaction be-
t,veen the defendant and the said Witherspoon and 
associates, and that the plaintiff would receive his 
15 
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entire 37,500 shares of stock in due course. . . . 
R-16, 17, 18,19, 20) 
"f) That the court erred in finding that 'the 
defendant did not cause the 37,500 shares of stock 
due the plaintiff to even be issued until May of 
1959. That he thereafter caused the stock to be 
transferred to persons other than the plaintiff.' '' 
(T-20) 
The respondent concedes that the date of May should 
have read January in the findings. This error has no 
significance so far as the ultimate facts are concerned. 
The undisputed fact is that the Appellant, Robert J. 
Pinder, was the chief executive officer of Standard and 
had the authority from both Standard and the Respond-
ent Lake, to effect the transaction as agreed between 
Standard and Lake. To deny that Pinder was not respon-
sible for causing the stock to be transferred to persons 
other than the plaintiff is to ignore the unchallenged por-
tion of the trial court's findings of fact, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 
cited above. Regardless of who actually had the duty in 
Standard to do the clerical work incident to the actual 
transfers of stock, this \\"'"as done under the authority of 
the President and not the Secretary or the Office Man-
ager, Borshard. The attempt to justify the failure of 
Pinder to cause the stock to be issued as agreed cannot 
be justified by reliance on the letter of authority to the 
Hereford Bank (Ex. -21) or the stock povrer in Yiew of 
the unchallenged findings contained in paragraph 5 
(Supra) ""here the court found the letter and stock power 
",.ere given to assist Pinder to raise funds to buy into the 
Texas franchise and that Pinder promised to issue the 
stock to Lake and to take the trade himself. These 
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undisputed findings show that Lake, by executing the 
documents (Ex. -21, 22), did not intend to give up any 
rights as contended for by appellant. 
PoiNT II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE UNCHALLENGED 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENTS. 
The appellant takes exception to the findings of fact 
made by the trial judge in six particulars (see exceptions 
numbered A to F, at pages 14, 15, 16, and 17 of Appel-
lant's brief). The remainder of the findings are not chal-
lenged and these findings alone justify the conclusions 
of law and judgment made by the trial court. 
The court found that the defendant Pinder agreed 
to deliver the plaintiff's L. H. & L. stock only when 
Standard Gilsonite Company had issued in payment 
37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite stock. Pinder further 
agreed to handle the sale of this stock as trustee for Lake 
and to sell it at the best possible prices and even guaran-
teed to sell15,000 shares at not less than $1.00 per share. 
(R-16) 
The defendant protests that Pinder could not be a 
trustee because there was not yet any stock issued to 
Lake and therefore there 'vas no trust res. This conten-
tion is without merit on two grounds : 
1. Pinder held the authority from Lake to act as 
trustee in his stead to receive the 37,500 shares of stock. 
17 
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We have no argument as to the general proposition of 
law cited from the Restatement of Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 75, 
at page 20 of appellant's brief, but this has no applica-
tion here. Lake had a contractual right to receive 37,500 
shares of Standard Gilsonite stock and Pinder had agreed 
to act as trustee for Lake to obtain this stock. Pinder was 
trustee of this right and had a duty to carry out the trust 
agreement made with Lake. He occupied the position of 
chief executive officer of Standard and it was within his 
power to have it issued - the Board of Directors having 
already approved the issuance of the stock. A trust can 
be created of a right arising out of contract just as well 
as of any other property. 
'' Thns, it is held that a trust may exist in a bond, 
chose in action, contingent interests, expectan-
cies .... (emphasis supplied) 89 C. J. C. No. 24, 
Page 740. 
We do not see how the defendant can seriously con-
tend that a trustee appointed and agreeing to execute a 
valuable contractual right, i. e., to receive stock his bene-
ficiary is entitled to, and who is further empowered to 
sell that stock for the benefit of another, can deny his 
fiduciary capacity and duties because he causes the stock 
to be issued to others ! 
2. Regardless of this argument with respect to the 
existence of a trust the undisputed findings and the eYi-
dence conclusively show that Pinder agreed to obtain 
the stock for Lake and to dispose of it for Lake's benefit 
and he breached this agreement. The conclusion of la"' 
is supported by this finding also. The argument that 
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this is a gratuitous offer to create a trust and therefore 
without consideration, does not apply here. In this case 
Pinder extracted an agreement from Lake that he would 
allow Pinder to sell the stock for him so as not to harm 
the market for the stock which Pinder was anxious to 
establish for his own benefit as a major stockholder in 
the company: 
''As we agreed,'' he says, ''you won't go out 
naturally and dump this stock on the market. We 
are trying to build a market.'' ... ''He said this 
market was supposed to be around $3.00 about 
the last of March or middle of April.'' (R-62) ... 
he would not deliver my L. H. & L. stock until he 
made sure they would issue 37,500 shares which 
he would hold for me because he had a place on it 
and could sell it at places better than local 
brokers.'' (R-62) 
In addition to the above Lake agreed to allow Pin-
der to benefit personally from the arrangement by as-
signing part of his right to the stock to assist Pinder in 
obtaining funds to meet his commitments to the Home 
Equipment venture. The agreement was bilateral and 
adequate consideration was present to bind Pinder to 
perform. (See the undisputed portions of the court's 
findings of fact, paragraphs 2, 4, and 5. (R-16, 17, 18, 19) 
Pinder became trustee of the contractual right of Lake 
to the stock and he cannot avoid his fiduciary or con-
tractual duties to Lake by the spurious argument that 
since Pinder saw fit to not cause the stock to issue no 
trust could arise and the agreement was without consid-
eration. The citations in appellant's brief a.s to gratui-
tous agreements to create a trust (appellant's brief, P. 19, 
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20, 21, 22) do not apply since not only was the Lake-Pin-
der agreement bilateral for the reasons set forth above 
but if there was no further consideration than the act of 
Lake parting with his L. H. & L. stock, the agreement 
would be supported by an adequate consideration. 
''That a detriment suffered by the promisee 
at the promisor's request and as the price for the 
promise is sufficient, though the promisor is not 
benefitted, is well settled. It will be found that in 
most cases where there is a detriment to the prom-
isee there will also be a benefit to the promisor, 
because when the promisee does something detri-
mental to himself at the request of the promisor, 
the promisor must be assumed to make the request 
because he desired the performance in question 
and regarded it as beneficial to himself." (Willis-
ton on Contracts, No. 202, at pages 377 and 378.) 
The appellant in its brief spends seven pages arguing 
that there can be no conversion of the stock since it had 
never been issued by the corporation. This argument and 
the cases cited in the support have no releYance to this 
case. The amended complaint (R-8, 9, 10) and the findings 
of fact at no place state that the stock was converted and 
the court certainly did not make its determination on this 
theory. The theory of recovery pled in the amended 
complaint is that Pinder entered into an agreement 'Yith 
Lake to do the following things: 
a) To act as a trustee of Lake's stock in L. H. & L. 
Mining Company- and deliYer it to Standard only 
'vhen he ra used the issuance of 37,500 shares of 
Standard stock to Lake. 
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b) To cause the 37,500 shares of stock to issue to 
Lake. 
c) To hold the Standard stock and sell it for Lake's 
benefit. 
The court found that he made this agreement and 
that he breached it. It is not necessary to even consider 
the law of conversion as it might apply to the facts of this 
case. 
PoiNT III. 
THE DEFENDANT- APPELLANT MADE NO 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND 
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE YET 
ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE TO 
THIS COURT ON APPEAL BY AFFIDAVIT AND 
ARGUMENT IN HIS BRIEF. 
The defendant-appellant urges this court to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the 
court believed that the legend on the back of two of the 
checks given by Pinder to Lake were placed on the checks 
after they cleared the bank, and that this was not a fact. 
This point cannot properly be considered by this court 
on appeal because it has never been properly raised by 
the appellant either before the trial court or this court. 
The defendant-appellant made a motion for a new 
trial on September 21, 1960. The motion was not based 
on any "newly discovered evidence" (Rule 59 (a) (4) 
lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure), that the trial court was 
wrong in its conclusion as to the time of the endorse-
ments nor on the ground of "surprise" (Rule 59 (a) (3) 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) but solely on the ground 
that the ''evidence was insufficient to justify the decision'' 
and "that the decision is against the law and that there 
was an error in applying the law to the evidence in-
troduced." {R-23) 
The motion was argued on November 4, 1960, and 
while defendant argued that the court's comments with 
respect to the endorsements on the checks did not cor-
respond to the facts and stated that he could prove this, 
no evidence was offered. On January 16, 1961, two months 
after his motion for a new trial had been denied, and 
one month after defendant-appellant had filed his notice 
of appeal, appellant's attorney filed an affidavit pur-
porting to prove the fact that the endorsement was on 
the checks at the time they were given to the plaintiff 
and argues this as evidence in his brief on appeal just as 
if it was part of the record. 
If the defendant's appellant could not have had this 
evidence available at the trial Rule 59 (a) ( 4) permits 
him relief to present this new evidence to the Trier of Fact 
by making a motion under this rule provided the motion 
is supported by affidavit as required by Rule 59 (c). 
No such motion "\\"as ever made by the defendant-ap-
. 
pellant. Even though he had from September 14, 1960, 
to November 4, 1960, to obtain the alleged evidence he 
made no offer to the trial court and then after his motion 
for a new trial had been denied for two months he :filed an 
affidavit on J anua.ry 16, 1961, attempting to put this 
evidence into the record. It ""ould indeed be a novel rule of 
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procedure that would permit a litigant to introduce new 
evidence for the first time on appeal having failed to 
even make a motion for a new trial based on newly dis-
eovered evidence. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE 
PLAINTIFF THE HIGHEST MARKET PRICE OF 
THE STOCK FROM THE TIME OF REFUSAL TO 
DELIVER THE STOCK TO WITHIN A REASON-
ABLE TIME THEREAFTER. 
At the trial of this action the evidence showed that in 
th month of April, 1958, the defendant, Robert J. Pin-
der, a trustee of securities owned by the plaintiff, induced 
the plaintiff to execute what in effect were stock powers 
on the representation that the defendant desired to sell 
certain stock owned by him in order to raise money to 
put into a joint venture between the two parties, and 
agreed that either the plaintiff's stock, if used, would be 
replaced by stock of the defendant's or that the defend-
ant would cause other stock to be issued to the purchasers, 
but in any event that the defendant would carry out his 
trust obligation to hold the 37,500 shares of stock to which 
the plaintiff was entitled and to sell the same for the bene-
fit of the plaintiff. The evidence further shows that the 
defendant continuously promised that the 37,500 shares 
of stock would be issued to the plaintiff, and periodically 
advised the plaintiff that the stock had in fact been 
issued. The plaintiff in the fore part of June, 1958, made 
demand upon the defendant for the stock, and the defend-
ant then failed to deliver the stock. 
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The plaintiff respectfully submits that the measure 
of damages to be awarded the plaintiff in this action is 
the highest market value of the stock from the time of 
refusal of the defendant to deliver the stock to the plain-
tiff in June of 1958 to within a reasonable time thereafter. 
The question was considered in the case of Western 
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mirving Co., 
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664. In that case the stock was de-
livered to the defendant pursuant to a pledge agreement 
on the 20th day of February, 1914. The stock instead of 
being held was transferred and converted, and the lower 
court found that the failure to hold the stock as security 
and the act of transferring it upon delivery constituted a 
conversion of the stock. On appeal the question was raised 
as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the value of 
the stock at the date of conversion or to the higher value 
at a time some months subsequent to the conversion. In 
discussing this question the court set forth the following 
rule: 
"If it be assumed, however, that the sale was void 
and that appellant 'vas guilty of conversion of the 
stock, the judgment is, nevertheless, contrary· to 
law. The ordinary rule goYerning the measure of 
damages in cases "There the pledgee "~rongfully 
converts property pledged is the market Yalue of 
the property pledged, "Tith interest from the time 
it was conYerted. If the pledged property con-
sists of stocks or bonds of a fluctuating market 
price, then the measure of damages, under the 
New York rule, is the highest market price of 
such stocks or bonds 'vithin a reasonable time 
after the pledgor obtained notice of the sale of 
stock or bonds 'vhich 'vas illegally made.'' (West-
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ern Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated 
Mining Co., 192 Pac. 664 to p. 672.) 
This rule was also followed by the Federal Court in 
the case of Nephi Processing Co. v. Talbott, 247 Fed. 2d 
771. In this case the item converted happened to be tur-
keys delivered to the defendant. The question raised 
before the appellate court was whether or not the plain-
tiff was entitled to the value at the date of conversion or 
the highest market value within a reasonable time after 
the conversion. The lower court granted the plaintiff 
an instruction that the plaintiff was entitled to the high-
est market value and the defendant appealed on the 
ground that this instruction was in error and that the 
court should have instructed that the measure of dam-
ages was the value of the turkeys on the date of 
conversion. The court determined the question in the 
following language: 
''The Utah courts have recognized that as a gen-
eral rule the measure of damages for conversion 
of property is the value of the property at the 
time of the conversion, plus interest. . . . It has 
been held, however, that the rule has no applica-
tion where the converted chattels are of a kind 
which have a fluctuating value. In such cases the 
measure of damages is the highest market price 
of the property within a reasonable time after 
the O\vner has notice of the conversion. Restate-
ment I~aw of Restitution, Par. 151 (c) ; 53 Am. 
Jur., Trover and Conversion, Sec. 99, Gallagher 
v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Supeme Court 335, 32 
La\v Ed. 658, Newberger Cotton Co. vs. Stevens 
167 ..:\rk 275, 267 S. W. 777, 40 A. L. R. 1279 In 
Re Solomon, Weed & Co. Inc., 53 Fed. 2d 335, 79 
.A .. L. R. 379. See also 40 A. L. R. 1282, 87 A. L. R. 
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817. The Utah Supreme Court has accepted this 
rule.'' 
In the Nephi Processing case the conversion of the 
turkeys occurred in February of 1954. The court per-
mitted evidence of the highest market value between 54, 
55 and 56, and granted the highest market value which 
was in December of 1954. In the Lake v. Pinder case it is 
difficult to determine exactly when the breach of trust 
took place. Certainly there was no denial of the right of 
the plaintiff to the stock up to June of 1958 when demand 
was made for delivery of the stock. Prior to that time 
the defendant had recognized his trust and had assured 
the plaintiff that he would carry it out by obtaining the 
stock for the benefit of the plaintiff and selling the stock 
at the best possible market price for the benefit of the 
plaintiff. It was not until June of 1958 that the plaintiff 
after repeated assurances and promises from the de-
fendant demanded the stock and the defendant failed 
to deliver it. 
Under the above cited cases the appropriate measure 
of damages to be applied is the highest market value from 
June of 1958 until the time of trial which was at least 
$2.50 per share. See Exhibits 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. The 
witness, Kay Ralph Bowman, sold stocks at $2.50 per 
share in l\Iay, 1959 (R-93). Gus & Stead, brokers, traded 
large amounts as shown by their records. The National 
Quotations exceeded $2.50 per share. 
The court treated the trust agreement as breached 
as of the time of the transaction with 1\IcGee and With-
erspoon in April, 1958, and fixed the damages as of that 
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time when there was only a $.30 per share market for the 
stock. This was in error since until June there was ac-
tually no refusal on the part of Pinder to carry out the 
agreement; in fact, he constantly promised to do so. The 
damages therefore should have been the highest market 
value from June, 1958, until a reasonable time thereafter, 
which under the rule of Nephi Processing Co. v. Talbott, 
247 Fed. 2d 771, would be at least a year thereafter. Dur-
ing this period the stock traded nationally at a high of in 
excess of $2.50 per share. We submit the judgment should 
be increased to reflect the correct measure of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The court correctly found a breach of the trust 
agreement by the defendant-appellant but erred in de-
termining the measure of damages. 
The trial court's judgment as to liability should be 
affirmed and the error of the trial court in fixing the 
damages should be corrected to award the plaintiff-re-
spondent the highest market value of the stock within a 
reasonable time after the breach which was $2.50 per 
share for the 31,500 shares. 
Respectfully submitted 
McBROOM & HYDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Respondent a.nd 
Cross-Appellant 
315 East Second South 
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
